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PRELIMINARY
Abstract
We exploit the 1980 earthquake in southern Italy and the subsequent relief from mandatory
military service granted to all males in the regions hit by the seism to estimate the strength of
endogenous social interactions in schooling achievements. Preliminary results point to a signiﬁcant
and strong eﬀect of interactions not mediated by markets.
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1 Introduction.
The last decade has seen a burgeoning literature involving concepts such as social interactions, peer
eﬀects, social norms, band-wagon eﬀects and the like. A sense of this upsurge can be given by ﬁg-
ure (1) where we report the number of EconLit hits found searching abstracts and titles for social
interaction and peer-eﬀect. Out of nearly 200 hits since 1973, more than a half are posterior to 1995.
The theoretical underpinnings of these concepts are relatively clear, and boil down to the workings
of some kind of market failure such that in equilibrium the dependence of individual behaviours on
the aggregate behaviour of some reference group is not considered by agents when making their deci-
sions (e.g. externalities). The empirical counterpart is much weaker because of serious identiﬁcation
problems. As made clear by the seminal work of Manski (1993), this is basically due to the fact
that average behaviour, which supposedly feeds back into individual outcomes if such mechanisms are
at work, carries no additional information on top of that already embodied into observed individual
outocomes. In the literature this missing information is generally recovered by imposing a structure
to the problem being studied, either making assumptions on the functional form for the link between
aggregate and individual outcomes (e.g. a non-linear function of individual behaviours) or excluding
any other possible relationship between average characteristics of a group and individual outcomes.
This is a legitimate strategy when the structure derives from the theoretical predictions of a model;
it is not when the assumptions are made exclusively to achieve identiﬁcation. When this is the case a
more credible strategy is to rely on genuine additional information beyond that provided by individual
outcomes. This boils down to ﬁnding suitable instruments for aggregate outcomes.
The rewards for a reliable estimation of such eﬀects are high, especially when it comes to policy
design, due to their increasing importance as a major ingredient in several ﬁelds of economic theory
such as economic growth, spatial agglomeration, inequality, technological choices and so on (see Brock
and Durlauf (2000) and Moﬃtt (2000) for comprehensive lists).
In this paper we want to measure the strength of social interaction eﬀects as the determinants of
individuals educational choices and attainments. The existence of peer-eﬀects is a crucial element for2
the assessment of various issues linked to the design of an eﬃcient school system: the virtues of an
environment where public and publicly funded private schools coexist crucially depend on the size of
the peer-eﬀect (Hsieh and Urquiola (2002)); the trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and equity in allocationg
limited resources can be signiﬁcantly mitigated by explicit consideration of these mechanisms.
To overcome the identiﬁcation problem outlined above we adopt the instrumental variable approach.
We exploit the fact that after the 1980 earthquake that hit some southern Italian regions, the Gov-
ernment relieved from mandatory military service several cohorts of young males in those regions. We
speculate that the relief was actually used by these males to increase years of schooling, either by
higher university enrollment rates or by higher high school completion rates. Since in Italy females
are not subject to military service, the relief had no direct eﬀect on their choices. Therefore, if social
interaction played no role in determining individual outcomes we should observe no eﬀect on females’
schooling in those cohorts. On the contrary, any observed change can be taken as triggered by social
interactions.
Our preliminary results suggest that these eﬀects are actually quite strong. For males the military
service relief exogenously increased average education by around 10 weeks; the increase in average
females’s education in the same group was anything between 7 and 8 weeks.
The paper is organised as follows. Section (2) describes the methodological issues of identiﬁcation.
We then outline our empirical strategy in section (3). Section (4) describes the earthquake and
makes the point that it indeed caused an exogenous shift in males’ education. Estimates of the social
multiplier are given in section (5). Section (6) concludes and outlines further research.
2 A theoretical background: the identiﬁcation problem.
In this section we brieﬂy discuss the standard identiﬁcation problem and show how it can be overcome
when suitable data ara available. We also show how identiﬁcation of the parameter can be achieved
by looking only at aggregate data. Throughout the section we mainly follow Manski (1993) and adopt
his terminology.3
We focus on the case where the outcome variable is continuous; in principle, one could look at
decisions, so that the endogenous variable would be a discrete one (see Brock and Durlauf (2001)).
Let us assume that individuals’ outcomes follow a simple general linear rule1:
yic = α + βXic + γ ¯ Xc + λZc + θ¯ yc + uic (1)
where Xic are individual exogenous characteristics (such as sex, parental income or education, etc.).
Xc collects the averages of these characteristics in the relevant group over which interaction takes
place; it captures the fact that individual outcomes may vary with the exogenous characteristics of
the group. The parameter γ thus captures the exogenous interaction eﬀect. Zc gathers information
about features of the group or the environment in which agents act (e.g. geographical or structural
characteristics) which are likely to aﬀect individual behaviour; it thus captures the fact that outcomes
may be similar because the environment is; thus λ captures a simple correlation eﬀect. yc is the
average outcome in the group and should capture the fact that, all else equal, individual outcomes
may be aﬀected by the average performance in the reference group. This endogenous interaction eﬀect
is captured by θ.





















Zc + uic (2)
Equation (2) only provides information about the workings of some interaction (either exogenous
or endogenous) when the coeﬃcient on ¯ Xc is diﬀerent from zero; yet we cannot disentangle one from
the other.
Identiﬁcation of the two parameters becomes possible if the outcome variable of some randomly
chosen members of the groups is exogenously altered. In such a situation, θ is identiﬁed by the
1We assume throughout that average outcome is the relevant variable to look at. Assuming that endogenous in-
teraction occurs through a non linear combination of individual outcomes (say, their variance) would recover directly
identiﬁcation; yet, it would be just out of functional form which, in the absence of any theoretical prior, would be too
strong an hypothesis.4
exogenous shift of the average outcome in the groups aﬀected by the treatment. Formally, let us
augment (1) with a shift variable Tic which equals unity for the NT
c members of some group c hit by
the shock and zero otherwise; δ is by how much the outcome variable has been exogenously shifted.
Thus we have:
yic = α + βXic + γ ¯ Xc + λZc + θ¯ yc + δTic + uic
Let nc be the share of treated individuals in group c,t h estrength of the treatment in group c.I n
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nc + uic (3)
Equation (3) now allows us to separately identify exogenous and endogenous interactions (γ and θ)
provided there is suﬃcient variability in the share of treated people across groups and Tic does not
overlap with other observable individual characteristics included in Xic.
As it will be made clear in the next section, the natural experiment we exploit in the analysis is such
that treatment, when given, was addressed only to males. Let us deﬁne a dummy Tc only indexed
to group, which equals one when treatment was given to males in group c and zero otherwise. Thus
rewriting equation (1) separately for males and females:
yM
ic = α + βXic + γ ¯ Xc + λZc + θ¯ yc + δTc + uic (4)
yF
ic = α + βXic + γ ¯ Xc + λZc + θ¯ yc + uic
and recalling that group averages are related to sex-group ones by:
¯ yc = mcyM
c +( 1− mc)yF
c (5)
¯ xc = mcxM
c +( 1− mc)xF
c
where we have deﬁned mc as the share of males in group c, yields the following reduced forms for
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Identiﬁcation is achieved by the ratio between coeﬃcients of Tc and mcTc.Y e t ,mc must have suﬃcient
variability across groups in order to avoid multicollinearity among the explanatory variables. Therefore
our preferred strategy will imply making the assumption mc =0 .5 ∀c. In this case estimation of
equations (6) identiﬁes θ by the ratio of the estimated coeﬃcients on Tc for males and females.
3 An outline of the empirical strategy, data and deﬁnitions.
In this section we outline our empirical strategy and introduce some deﬁnitions. Let us recall the
aim of this paper. We want to assess the existence (and strenght) of endogenous interactions eﬀects
in schooling. The previous section has made clear that to identify such a social multiplier in a quite
general speciﬁcation of the decision problem it is crucial that the decision variable of some (identiﬁable)
members of a given group is exogenously shifted; then, any eﬀect on the other members of the same
group can only be due to endogenous interaction among individuals.
We think that the earthquake that hit southern Italy in 1980 makes a genuine (yet dramatic) natural
experiment suitable to our purposes. Immediately after the earthquake the Government relieved from
mandatory military service (MS) all males who were to be drafted in the period 1981-1987 and residing
in the earthquake area. The next section describes the event and carefully details the reasons why we
can safely use it to our purposes.
Before we can move on to identifying the social multiplier (Section 5) we must ﬁll two gaps. First,
identiﬁcation of a social multiplier requires a deﬁnition of the group in which social interaction takes
place. Second, we must clearly deﬁne what is the variable we think may be aﬀected by such interaction.
The rest of this section deals with these two issues.6
3.1 Groups.
Throughout most of the paper we mantain the assumption that the group over which interaction takes
place is the pool of people born in the same municipality and belonging to the same age cohort. Thus,
if the relief from MS caused a shift in males’ education, we can identify the social multiplier by looking
at what happened to education of females belonging to the same cohort-municipality.
We think this deﬁnition of group is a reasonable assumption for several reasons. First, Italian
municipalities are generally small: out of 8100 only 6 count a population larger than 500000 thousand.
Second, as next section will make clear, the event we exploit to identify these kinds of interaction
focuses on individuals aged 14 to 18 thus spending most of their time either in school or anyway with
their schoolmates.Both facts undoubtely favour the workings of the kind of interaction we are after.
3.2 Measures of schooling.
S of a rw eh a v eb e e nl o o s ei nd e ﬁn i n gw h a tw em e a nb y schooling or education. The ideal quantitative
measure would be years of school attendance. Unfortunately our main data source, the 1991 population
census, only reports information on completed schooling at the survey date. In 1991 the cohorts
relieved from military service were aged 25 to 29, with most of them having ﬁnalised their education.
Yet, actual years of education are likely to be underreported: on the one hand we miss all schooling
taken by people still in school at the survey date and on the other all schooling taken by drop-outs on
top of their declared completed education. In order to mitigate this measurement problem, we assign
some years of education on top of the declared competed level to all those individuals that in the 1991
census reported being still students. We impute to these individuals (AGE −6) years of schooling, on
the grounds that primary school starts at the age of 6.
Another way of looking at the problem is studying the decision of attending university. We would
then like to have a measure of enrollment of people belonging to any given cohort-municipality. Again,
it is not available (we do not know whether a given individual ever attended university unless she
completed it). This measure would be more reliable at capturing imitation eﬀects or the simple
transmission of information since it only considers the decision of attending university which is likely7
to have been taken in the municipality of birth. The quantitative measure could instead also capture,
say, university ﬁxed eﬀects (better vs. worse universities attended, etc.), all eﬀects which although
interesting, we could not identify unless we were sure that all individuals of a given municipality-cohort
attended the same university (or department, etc.). Yet, the situation is not so bad since, although
there are serious reasons why we could not safely assume that all people of a given group attended
the same university, it is also true that that there are serious reasons to assume that the pattern of
mobility of teenagers to attend university are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between control and treated
municipalities; if they were then our estimates could mistake a, say, university eﬀect, for a social
interaction eﬀect.
Another problem is related to the requirement that people were actually residing in the earthquake
regions to beneﬁt from the relief from MS. This information is not available in the census, where only
current residence and place of birth are collected. We then choose to proxy the place of residence at
the time of the earthquake with the place of birth and assume that all people in the relevant cohorts
and born in those municipalities comply with the requirement. This assumption would be a problem
if people aged 14-18 in 1980 and born in the earthquake municipalities have a higher probability of
being resident somewhere else in 1980, thus not being allowed to exploit the relief. Then, if, say, their
education turns out to be higher than in the comparison group, this could not be taken as evidence
that the relief increased schooling. The next section deals also with this issue.
4 A natural experiment? The 1980 earthquake.
On the evening of November 23rd 1980 southern Italy was hit by an exceptional earthquake. Around
650 municipalities and more than 5 milion persons were aﬀected by the seismic event. In ﬁgure (??)
we show the area and, the darker region, the epicentre of the seismic event. Earthquakes continued
to hit until late February 1981.
The Government took immediate action to sustain the population hit by the seismic episodes.
Several intervention plans were rapidly passed. Among those, the relief from mandatory military8
service for all males born in the period 1962-66 with legal residence in the municipalities hit by the
earthquake.
While all kinds of ﬁnancial help were related to measures of damage established by a commission
of experts appointed by the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs, the relief was granted independently of the
damage borne by the individual, his family or his municipality.
4.1 Did males’ education change because of the MMSR?
A relief from mandatory military service does not, by itself, increase school attendance or completion
rates. Individuals may just behave, as concerns schooling, as they would in the absence of the relief.
For example, someone who drops out from upper secondary school before completion because of the
draft and then starts working may just as well drop out at the same age and immediately start working.
We must then be sure that the MMSR actually determined a change in the schooling of males who
were granted it. If this turns out to be the case, then an exogenous shock (the earthquake) caused a
shift in the endogenous variable and we can use it as an instrument to identify the social multiplier.
We have seen that not all municipalities in the earthquake region were damaged to the same extent:
those closest to the epicentre borne the largest costs while those along the border of Campania and
Basilicata were generally not signiﬁcantly aﬀected. The cohorts of 1962-66 of males living in these
municipalities were nonetheless given the opportunity of skipping the military service.
To assess the extent to which the relief altered males’ schooling in the municipalities involved, we
need a benchmark group. In selecting treated and control municipalities we attempted to replicate
what would have been the outcome of a random assignment of the treatment (the quake). Therefore
we selected a portion of the Italian territory that included both type of municipalities, that beside
being selected and not, did share the same characteristics. To implement this selection rule we choose
all the municipalities on the boundaries of the areas that beneﬁted of the relief of the Mandatory
Military Service, and for the control group all the municipalities that were neighbourhood of at
least one member of the treated group. We end up with 117 municipalities belonging to 12 provinces
(Benevento, Caserta, Foggia, Matera, Potenza, Bari, Campobasso, Cosenza, Frosinone, Isernia, Latina,9
Taranto) of 5 regions ( Lazio,Molise, Puglia Campania, Basilicata, Calabria) with a total population
at the end of 1979 of about 900.000 people. Figure (??) shows the treated and control municipalities
selected, the former in darker grey. The detailed list of the selected towns are reported in the appendix.
This choice has several advantages. First since treated municipalities are rather peripheral with
respect to the centre of the earthquake they suﬀered little damages, very much like the non treated
municipalities. Table (1) presents a synthetic indicator of the damages suﬀered by the treated mu-
nicipalities. It combines 6 indicators of damage that take into account speciﬁc damages (number of
people who died or were injured in the quake, number of people who lost their house, the index of the
damage computed by the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs, number of houses destroyed, number of houses
damaged, number of temporary houses needed). The synthetic indicator summarise these six indexes
into a scale that ranges from 6 to 30: a municipality would score 6 if there were no deaths or injured
people, the homeless were less than 2 per cent of the population, the index of the Ministry of Internal
Aﬀairs was less than 5 per cent, the destroyed houses were less than 0,5 per cent those damaged less
than 1 per cent, and temporary shelter was needed for less than 5 per cent of the population. At
the other extreme a municipality would score 30 if at least 10 per cent of the population died or was
injured, at least 20 per cent were homeless, the index of the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs was at least
70 per cent, more than 30 per cent of the houses were destroyed or heavily damaged and temporary
shelter was needed for more than 40 per cent of the population. The synthetic indicator has been
grouped into 6 classes as indicated in the Table. For each class we report the number of municipalities
involved and few basic statistics (mean, max, min, and standard error) of their synthetic index. Only
49 of our 57 treated municipalities are reported in the table because several of them were considered
outside of the area involved by the quakes (yet they were included in the group that enjoyed the lift
of the MMS.). Only two out of 49 municipalities suﬀered serious damages as they were included in
the third group and had a average score of 18. Another group of 16 municipalities are in group 3 with
an average score of 12,7. The rest of the municipalities are included in the last two group, 14 of them
with a mean score of 8,3 and 17 of them with a mean score of 6.
The second advantage of our choice is that by including all municipalities on the boundaries that10
Table 1: Assessment of damages.
Class of damage Number Mean score max score min score se
(Range 6-30)
1) very highly damaged: municipalities in the Cratere
00 00 0
2) highly damaged: municipalities outside the Cratere with score≥ 20
00 00 0
3) Score 16-20
21 8 , 02 01 6 2 , 0
4) Score 11-15
16 12,7 15 11 1,2
5) Score 7-10
14 8,3 10 7 1,0
6) Score 6
17 6 6 6 0
stretch in the direction north-south we are actually selecting into our sample a wide variety of people.
Thus our results should be held to be quite general and not depending on the choice of a very narrowly
deﬁned group. Our sample allows us to claim that our result would apply to (at least) a large portion
of the Italian population.
The third advantage refers to comparability of the treated and control group. Since each municipality
in the control group neighbours with at least a treated municipality, the two group should roughly share
the same characteristics. In Table (2, 3 and 4), we look at three diﬀerent groups of characteristics and
check how they diﬀer across treated and controls municipalities. The ﬁrst group, examined in table (2),
refers to structural characteristics. We report the distribution of the municipalities across provinces,
their size and some physical attributes. Although treated municipalities appears on average smaller
in terms of squared kilometers (382) than control (459) there is a great deal of heterogeneity in each
group so that their diﬀerence is not statistically diﬀerent than zero. Same message is delivered when
we look at the population as measure of the size. Treated municipalities are on average smaller than
the control ( 4960 people versus 10245) however the dispersion with group is such that the diﬀerence of11
the mean size is hardly diﬀerent than zero. More evidence of systematic diversity between treated and
control is delivered by the population density that suggests that people in treated municipalities are
more sparse (13 people per square kilometer) than the other group (18 people per square kilometer).
The diﬀerence seems to be statistically signiﬁcant. Notice that this result make more diﬃcult to ﬁnd
social interaction in the treated group. Although a larger share of the treated municipalities is located
in mountains the average altitude does not diﬀer between treated and control.
Table (3) reports population characteristics. Overall the larger diﬀerences seem to be limited to
births and death rate. Treated and control municipalities are more alike along gender composition,
mobility patterns and age composition of the population. In 1979, 283.000 people were living in the
treated municipalities and 615.000 in the control. People born alive in the two groups of municipalities
are almost the same (1,5 and 1,6 per cent of the population) but the diﬀerence is still statistically
diﬀerent from zero because of the small within-group variance. The fertility rate is smaller in the
treated group (2,9 per cent of female population) than in the control (3,1 per cent) and the distance
is statically large. In 1979, 9 people died over 1000 in the treated group, only marginally, and yet
signiﬁcantly, more than the control group. Males are slightly less than females in both groups; mobility
patters seems to be alike across treated and control group.
Table (4) deals with school characteristics; the main message delivered by the table is that up to 8
grade, treated municipalities, in comparison with control, have less student as a ratio of the population
and a higher endowment of both schools and rooms. Therefore have smaller school and class size. We
need to take into account those diﬀerences as long as these diﬀerences may inﬂuence the number of
years of schooling achieved by the population. However good news come from high schools where the
diﬀerences disappear altogether; treated and controls are all alike along the all dimension; they have
an equal number of students in the population, same amount of school, same density and the same
ratio between high-school students versus student enrolled in grade lower than 9th.
We conclude that the municipalities closest to the border of the earthquake area, yet outside it (Lazio,
Puglia, Calabria) make a suitable control group for the municipalities lying along the inner border
of the earthquake area. The facts shown above make us sure that these two groups of municipalities12
Table 2: Structural characteristics of municipalities in the sample.
Tretaed Control All Treated
vs Control
Mean share Mean share Mean share
or counta or sd or counta or sd or counta or sd coeﬀ tstat
Total 57 60 117
Benevento 12 0.211 12 0.103
Caserta 15 0.263 15 0.128
Foggia 5 0.088 12 0.2 17 0.145
Matera 8 0.140 8 0.068
Potenza 17 0.298 17 0.145
Bari 7 0.117 7 0.060
Campobasso 9 0.150 9 0.077
Cosenza 15 0.250 15 0.128
Frosinone 5 0.083 5 0.043
Isernia 7 0.117 7 0.060
Latina 3 0.050 3 0.026
Taranto 2 0.033 2 0.017
Size
Land (km2) 382.7 386 458.9 583 421.75 496 -76.2 -0.83
People (1980) 4961 7554 10245 22475 7671 17073 -5284 -1.69
Pop. dens. 12.8 8.5 17.8 16.52 15.4 13.42 -5 -2.04
Location
Internal Mount. 29 0.51 17 0.283 46 0.393
Costal Mount. 20 . 0 41 0.017 3 0.026
Internal Hills 23 0.40 30 0.500 53 0.453
Costal Hills 10 . 0 26 0.100 7 0.060
Flat Land 20 . 0 46 0.100 8 0.068
Altitudeb 496.1 225 456.1 265.9 475.6 246.6 40.09 0.88
Costal Mun.
-No 53 0.930 53 0.883 106 0.906
-Yes 4 0.070 4 0.067 8 0.068
Less than 5 km
from the coast 003 0.050 3 0.026
a) Population weighted
b) meters above sea level13
Table 3: Population characteristics at 31 Dec. 1979.
Tretaed Control All Tretaed
vs Control
Mean Mean Mean
or counta sd or counta sd or counta sd coeﬀ tstat
Total population 282780 614742 897522
Born alive/Population 0.015 0.003 0.016 0.003 0.016 0.003 -0.002 -2.91
Born alive/Female 0.029 0.006 0.032 0.006 0.031 0.006 -0.004 -3.16
Deaths/Population 0.009 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.001 2.36
Males 0.494 0.054 0.494 0.007 0.494 0.031 0.000 -0.01
Inﬂow 0.017 0.006 0.020 0.011 0.019 0.010 -0.003 -1.35
-from abroad 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.08
Outﬂow 0.023 0.009 0.021 0.007 0.022 0.008 0.002 1.43
-abroad 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.11
Age composition
(6-14/all population) 0.140 0.047 0.151 0.019 0.147 0.031 -0.010 -1.66
a) Population weighted
make a homogeneous population and that the MMSR granted after the earthquake to some of them
can actually be seen as a treatment to these municipalities. For the sake of brevity we will often refer,
when no confusion can be generated, to the municipalities in the earthquake area as treated and to
the ones outside as control.
We now turn to the crucial question. Did males use the relief to go more to school? Figure (2)
answers this question and adds arguments to the reliability of the comparison between the two groups
of municipalities. On the vertical axis we report average years of males’ schooling in the two groups
of municipalities; on the horizontal axis there is age in 1991; schooling of the control group is the full
line. It is striking that the average levels of schooling are nearly identical for all the cohorts aged
30-50, while they move apart for the cohorts aged 25-28, those directly treated.
Taken together the evidence presented in this section makes us suﬃciently conﬁdent that the dif-
ference between males’ schooling for the cohorts 1962-66 in the two groups of municipalities is largely
exogenous. We can thus use the earthquake and subsequent military relief as a valid instrument to
identify the workings of social interactions. This is done in the next section.14
Table 4: School characteristics, 1979.
Tretaed Control All Tretaed
vs Control
Mean share Mean share Mean share
or counta or sd or counta or sd or counta or sd coeﬀ tstat
Primary schools
Student/pop. 0.084 0.024 0.094 0.014 0.091 0.019 -0.011 -2.93
Schools/pop. 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 3.03
Rooms/pop. 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.001 4.41
Student/school 198.4 194.8 350.5 225.4 302.6 226.7 -152.1 -3.54
Student/room 16.5 4.714 25.4 7.890 22.6 8.142 -8.8 -6.31
Junior High school
Student/pop. 0.056 0.024 0.056 0.007 0.056 0.015 0.000 0.13
Schools/pop. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.59
Rooms/pop. 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.000 2.32
Student/school 306.3 152.8 444.1 160.2 400.7 169.8 -137.8 -4.25
Student/room 19.5 3.197 21.5 2.748 20.9 3.037 -2.0 -3.43
High Schools
Student/pop. 0.047 0.052 0.049 0.042 0.049 0.046 -0.002 -0.27
Schools/pop. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.40
Rooms/pop. 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.023 0.003 0.002 0.000 -0.03
Student/school 252.3 156.4 326.6 187.4 306.6 180.4 -74.3 -1.10
Student/room 17.9 2.402 18.7 3.336 18.5 3.091 -0.7 -0.61
HS/(JHS+PRI)b 0.321 0.348 0.321 0.283 0.321 0.304 0.000 0.01
a) Population weighted
b) High School/(Junior HS + Primary) students.15
Table 5: Cohorts 1962-1966.
endogenous
males females interaction
bM S.E. bF S.E. ˆ θ S.E.
25-28 0.3028 0.1015 0.4623 0.1094 1.21 0.1127
5 The social multiplier.
We are now ready to undertake the main task of the paper and provide estimates for the endogenous
interaction coeﬃcient. Our dependent variables will be average males’ and females’ years of schooling
in each of the 117 municipalities considered. We will estimate several speciﬁcations of the two reduced
forms (6) separately and then determine the implied endogenous interaction coeﬃcient θ. All estimates
are weighted by the number of observations in the municipality-age cell.
We start out providing estimates for the two reduced forms obtained only on the sample of cohorts
1962-66, that is those relieved from MS in the municipalities hit by the earthquake.
Since the shock is truly exogenous (the earthquake) we can safely estimate this speciﬁcations not
worrying about individual as well as group and municipality controls (Xic, ¯ Xc,Z c). Therefore we
estimate:
yM
c = aM + bMEc (7)
yF
c = aF + bFEc
where Ec equals one for the municipalities c where males were relieved from MS. Recall that we
identify θ by means of the ratio between males’ and females’ reduced form coeﬃcients on Ec, under
the working assumption that the share of males equals one half in all municipalities. The assumption
is not crucial since it is not too far away from true data. Moreover our main source of identiﬁcation
is the endogenous eﬀect on females and not the variability of treatment across municipalities. Results
are shown in table (5). The estimated bM for males says that on average males’ schooling went up
by roughly 4 months becasue of the military service relief. The coeﬃcient is precisely estimated and
strongly signiﬁcant. The eﬀect of males’ relief from MS on females (bF) is actually stronger, roughly 616
months of additional schooling. These estimates for the reduced form coeﬃcients imply a strong eﬀect
of endogenous interaction. Actually this eﬀect is even too strong: the social multiplier being greater
than unity, an equilibrium in the simple model shown in section (2) would not exist. The problem
with these estimates is that we are assigning all diﬀerences in females’ education across municipalities
to the workings of endogenous interaction. We want to be more strict and allow for possibly diﬀerent
average education levels across the two groups of municipalities. We do this by adopting a discontinuity
design approach: we include in our sample also slightly older age groups, that is those who were not
relieved from military service even if they belonged to the municipalities hit by the earthquake. In
the ﬁrst speciﬁcation we estimate, we introduce a further control Tc which equals one for all age
groups belonging to municipalities hit by the earthquake, even if they were not relieved from MS; this
allows us to control also for a possible diﬀerent intercept in average education across the two groups
of municipalities. The reduced form diﬀerential eﬀects due to military relief are again captured by a
dummy Ec which now equals unity only for the age-municipality groups relieved from MS. The second
more ﬂexible speciﬁcation we estimated allows for a municipality-speciﬁc intercept, Gc. Again in both
speciﬁcations identiﬁcation of θ obtains from the ratio between bM and bM. As a very preliminary
robustness check we run both speciﬁcations on diﬀerent samples, including more and more cohorts,
as it will be clear below. In both speciﬁcations possible secular increase in education is controlled
for by including also age among the regressors. Results for the relevant coeﬃcients are reported in
tables (6) and (7); the ﬁrst column of both tables reports the age groups included in the samples;
the last two columns report the implied θ and its standard error, computed by means of a Taylor
expansion around the estimated values for bM and bM (delta method). The reduced form coeﬃcients
{bM,b F} turn out to be very stable across samples for both speciﬁcations, more so for males, and gain
signiﬁcance as sample size increases. Moreover, they are lower than those reported in table (5): the
reduction is much larger for women, signalling that indeed the age control plays a role in explaining
part of the diﬀerence between education levels of females in the cohorts 1962-66 in the two groups of
municipalities. Although both coeﬃcients turn out to be lower when municipality-speciﬁc dummies
are introduced, the implied θs remain almost unchanged and statistically signiﬁcant. These results17
Table 6: Model: yc = a + bEc + dTc + hAGEc.
endogenous
males females interaction
bM S.E. bF S.E. ˆ θ S.E.
28-29 0.180 0.267 -0.02 0.293 -0.25 4.14
27-30 0.166 0.183 0.090 0.198 0.703 1.12
26-31 0.198 0.149 0.164 0.160 0.906 0.61
25-32 0.204 0.130 0.179 0.138 0.935 0.50
25-33 0.212 0.123 0.197 0.131 0.963 0.44
25-34 0.206 0.117 0.181 0.126 0.935 0.45
25-35 0.201 0.112 0.196 0.120 0.987 0.41
25-36 0.209 0.109 0.189 0.116 0.950 0.40
Table 7: Model: yc = bEc + dGc + hAGEc.
endogenous
males females interaction
bM S.E. bF S.E. ˆ θ S.E.
28-29 0.191 0.117 - 0.028 0.139 0.344 2.014
27-30 0.108 0.083 0.060 0.088 0.714 0.760
26-31 0.131 0.068 0.124 0.071 0.973 0.386
25-32 0.131 0.061 0.114 0.065 0.931 0.366
25-33 0.148 0.060 0.136 0.062 0.958 0.304
25-34 0.139 0.057 0.118 0.059 0.918 0.321
25-35 0.134 0.056 0.134 0.057 1.000 0.298
25-36 0.146 0.055 0.125 0.056 0.923 0.29118
Table 8: Controlling for pre-trends.
endogenous
males females interaction
bM S.E. bF S.E. ˆ θ S.E.
25-50 0.217 0.078 0.061 0.080 0.439 0.217
25-50 0.730 0.082 0.400 0.088 0.707 0.013
are now consistent with existence of an equilibrium in the simple model introduced in section (2).
There are two main drawbacks with these results. First, we are controlling for a common time trend
for all municipalities. Inspection of ﬁgures (2) and (3) reveals that this is not a bad approximation
for males, less so for females. Second, the time trend is estimated only on a small set of age groups,
at most 11 data points for the sample 25-36. Therefore it is likely to be driven in a signiﬁcant way
by what happens in the age groups where endogenous interaction can be identiﬁed, the more so the
stronger the eﬀect of this kind of interaction. We tackle this issue by following a standard approach
in the literature (see, among others, Ashenfelter and Card (1985)): we build a counterfactual by
estimating a time pattern for education on the age groups not touched by the treatment (29-50); we
adopt a very ﬂexible speciﬁcation, allowing for a diﬀerent quadratic trend and intercept for the two
groups of municipalities and estimating again separately for men and women. We then extrapolate
this structure to the age groups left out, that is the 25-28 bracket for both sexes and all groups of
municipalities. We then regress the diﬀerences between actual and ﬁtted education on the dummy
Ec as deﬁned above. Results are reported in table (8). The ﬁrst row reports estimates where the
ﬁtted values are obtained using all coeﬃcients; in the second one we have ﬁtted by dropping 5% non
statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. Results show very diﬀerent estimates for θ, although both are 5%
signiﬁcant.
6 Conclusions and open questions.
In this paper we tackled the issue of identifying the workings of endogenous social interactions in
schooling, that is the dependence of individual outcomes on aggeregate ones in a way not mediated by19
markets. Rather than relying on ad hoc assumptions on the structure of the problem to be studied,
we build a natural experiment from the 1980 earthquake that severely hit some southern Italian
regions and the subsequent relief from mandatory military service granted to all males aged 14 to 18
living in the regions hit by the seism. We show that males exploited this relief by increasing their
average years of schooling by roughly ten weeks. Italian females are not subject to mandatory military
draft therefore the militart relief granted after the earthquake had no direct eﬀect on their choices.
Nonetheless we ﬁnd that their average years of schooling went up by 7 to 8 weeks. This can only be due
to the workings of some kind of endogenous social interaction. These results, although preliminary,
are robust to the choice of the cohorts chosen as control group. Yet, further robustness check are due.
We plan to perform the analysis on subsets of the municipalities belonging to our sample, to include
in our regressions family controls, to experiment with a diﬀerent measure of schooling by looking at
university enrollment rates. We think that these controls may be relevant because:
1. although we have shown that treated and control municipalities are on average very much alike,
the variances of characteristics and average outcomes within each group are large. Therefore,
we need to shrink both groups so as to make the comparison tighter;
2. we have run our regressions with no individual controls. This is legitimate since the shock is
fully orthogonal to any individual or municipality characteristics, delivering a consistent and
unbiased estimate for the reduced forms parameters. However, the estimated standard errors
are large implying, in some cases, non signiﬁcant estimates. A way to ﬁx this problem is to
perform the analysis at the individual level using a full set of individual controls;
3. average years of schooling as measured in the paper miss all the information about college drop-
outs. Yet, if social interaction aﬀects the decision whether to enroll at college then looking at
average completed years of schooling underestimates the strength of endogenous interactions.20
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